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Moore: Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century

LAWYER ETHICS CODE DRAFTING IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Nancy J. Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the American Bar Association ("ABA") created the
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,'
otherwise known as the Ethics 2000 Commission ("Commission"). 2 The
Commission was charged with conducting a comprehensive review of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") to determine
what changes were necessary to update the Model Rules and make them
relevant to the practice of law in the twenty-first century? In August
2001, the Commission issued a 300-page report recommending
numerous changes to the Rules.4 These recommendations have been
considered by the ABA House of Delegates and were largely approved.5
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Chief Reporter, ABA Commission
on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The views expressed in this Article are my
own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
1. See E. Norman Veasey, Chair's Introduction and Executive Summary to COMM'N ON
EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr, ABA, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE

HOUSE OF DELEGATES xi (2001) [hereinafter REPORT vrrH RECOMMENDATION], available at
http:llwww.abaneLorglcpr/e2k-whole .. rpt.doc (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. For the complete Commission Report which includes the Reporter's Explanation of
Changes, see generally REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supranote 1. See also Margaret Colgate
Love, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission: Final Report-Summary of Recommendations (2001)
[hereinafter Summary of Recommendations], at http:lwww.abaneLorglcpr/e2k-mlovearticle.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002). The Ethics 2000 Commission ("Commission") Report can be
downloaded in its entirety or by individual rule.
5. The House of Delegates met last August and considered the Preamble and Scope, as well
as Rules 1.0 through 1.10. See Ctr. for Prof'I Responsibility, ABA, Summary of House of Delegates
Action Taken at the August 2001 Annual Meeting, at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-summary
2001.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter August 2001 Summary]. The House considered
the remainder of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), except for Rules 5.5
and 8.5, at the American Bar Association ("ABA") mid-year meeting in February, 2002. For the
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As Chief Reporter to the Commission, I have had the privilege of
participating in this recent effort to enact comprehensive revisions to the
ABA's model ethics code. It has been a fascinating and educational
experience for me, and I welcome the opportunity to reflect on what I
have learned about ethics code drafting for lawyers in the twenty-first
century.
Even before I became associated with the Commission, I published
my views on the function of ethics codes in general and ethics codes for
lawyers in particular.6 In my view, a profession's code of ethics is one
aspect of a contract between society and the profession-a contract that
results when society agrees to give the profession a legal monopoly in
return for a promise that professional practice will be performed in the
public interest Under this contract account, a professional code of
ethics serves both ideological and regulative functions." As ideology, a
code establishes standards by which the profession (and the
professional) can be held to public account.9 In other words, society has
delegated responsibility to professions, but it can also relieve them of0
this responsibility if they do not live up to their public pronouncements.1
The regulatory function of codes is not limited to the use of coercive
sanctions like attorney discipline, but also includes "both the 'internal
sanction of professional conscience' and the 'informal external sanction
of peer criticism' to promote compliance with professional norms" as
part of the socialization of lawyers and other professionals."

see Ethics 2000-February 2002 Report, at
outcome
of these deliberations
http:llwww.abanet.orglcpre/e2k-202report-summ.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). Rules 5.5 and
8.5 will be considered along with the forthcoming report of the ABA Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice, which is scheduled to be considered at the annual meeting in August
2002.
6. See generally Nancy J. Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FouND. RES.
J. 773 [hereinafter Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered]; Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism:
Rekindled, Reconsidered or Reformulated?, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 1121 (1990); Nancy J. Moore, The
Usefulness of EthicalCodes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7 [hereinafter Moore, EthicalCodes].
7. See Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 12-14; Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered,
supra note 6, at 784.
8. See Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 13.
9. See id.; see also Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered, supranote 6, at 784.
10. See Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 13.
11. Id. at 14 (quoting John Kultgen, Evaluating Codes of ProfessionalEthics, in PROFITS AND
PROFESSIONS 225, 251 (Wade L. Robison et al. eds., 1983)). According to sociologist Talcott
Parsons, professionals are motivated to achieve "objective achievement and recognition," in ways
that are determined by the particular norms adopted by each profession. See Moore, Professionalism
Reconsidered, supra note 6, at 783 (quoting TALCOTr PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal
Profession, in ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 44 (1954)).
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Nothing in my experience with the Commission has changed these
views. I continue to believe that the best explanation of the validity of
professional codes is the contract account outlined above. Although I
continue to believe that codes serve both ideological and regulatory
functions, this Article will not discuss the ideological functions of ethics
codes. 2 Nor will I comment in any detail on the substance of the various
changes the Commission proposed. 3 Rather, my remarks will focus on
the types of regulatory changes that the Commission thought were
necessary in order to bring the Model Rules into the twenty-first century.
Before I discuss the changes, however, I want to comment briefly on the
significance of revising an existing code rather than creating an entirely
new code, as was done both in 1969 with the ABA Model Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility4 ("Model Code") and again in 1983 with the
Model Rules themselves. 5
II. REVISING AN EXIsTING ETHIcs CODE

In 1908 the ABA adopted its first model ethics code for lawyersthe ABA Canons of Ethics ("Canons"). 6 The Canons were7 primarily
exhortatory and were regarded by courts as advisory at most.
[T]he Canons were not law.... [T]heir syntax was exhortatory as
often as it was obligatory and they made no pretence at precision or
completeness. They did not have the authority of law, for they were
not legislatively adopted as such and were regarded by the courts as
advisory at most.'

12. For an interesting account of the Kutak Commission's interest in press coverage during
the drafting and adoption of the 1983 Model Rules, as well as its vision of the Rules as a
"professional covenant with the public," see Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The
Making of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 723-24 (1989).
13. For an excellent summary of the Commission's proposals, see Summary of
Recommendations, supranote 4.
14. MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The Model
Code was adopted in 1969, to be effective on January 1, 1970. See, e.g., Chris G. McDonough &
Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attorney Conduct: Specific Statutory Schemes v. General
Regulatory Guidelines, 11 ToURo L. REv. 609, 610-11 (1995). For a detailed discussion of the
history of the Model Code, see Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its
History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal
Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 77 (1981).
15. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

For a discussion of the history of the Model Rules, see generally Schneyer, supra note 12.
16. CANONS OFPROF'L ETHICS (1908).
17. See Hazard, supranote 14, at 81.
18. Id.
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This format corresponded to what has been characterized elsewhere as a
typical first level professional ethics code, i.e., "a simple set of ideals to
which adherents aspire."' 9 In 1964 the Wright Committee was appointed
to review the Canons 0 It concluded that the Canons were incomplete,
ambiguous, impractical for enforcement, insufficient as a guiding and
teaching tool, and not up to the challenges of a more complex legal
community and society. In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code,
which transformed the legal character of the rules of lawyer ethics. 3
Ethical
parts-Canons,
into
three
interdependent
Divided
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules-the DRs were intended to be
adopted by courts as a basis for enforcement through attorney discipline,
with the Canons and ECs serving both as interpretive guidance and as
inspirations to ideals beyond the minimum requirements of the DRs.
This format corresponded to what has been described elsewhere as a
typical "second-level" professional ethics code, i.e., one containing more
stringent language than a first-level code and designed to be enforced.2In 1977, less than ten years after ABA adoption of the Model Code,
the Kutak Commission was appointed to correct what were perceived as
serious defects in the Code.2 The work of this Commission led to the
adoption by the ABA, in 1983, of the Model Rules. 27 Unlike the Model
Code, the Model Rules did not accomplish a transformative structural
innovation.s Rather, the Rules reaffirmed and consolidated the prior
transformation from rules of ethics as internal professional norms to
rules of ethics as public law.2 9 This was accomplished by removing the

19. Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing literature in which various
professional codes of ethics are distinguished by their stage of development).
20. See McDonough & Epstein, supra note 14, at 610 (discussing the appointment by the
President of the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, better known as the
Wright Committee).
21. See id.; see also Hazard, supra note 14, at 85-93 (discussing various deficiencies in the
Model Code).
22. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
23. See Hazard, supra note 14, at 81.
24. See id. at 81-82.
25. See Moore, EthicalCodes, supra note 6, at 15.
26. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.4, at 60-61 (1986).
27. See Schneyer, supra note 12, at 677-78.
28. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991)
("In retrospect, it is clear that the crucial step in the 'legalization' process occurred in the change
from the 1908 Canons to the 1970 Code, rather than from the Code to the 1983 Rules.").
29. See id. at 1254. Professor Hazard notes that "[tihe Rules of Professional Conduct ...
implied that the normative definition of the profession could be expressed only using the medium of
legally binding rules ....Correlatively, the Rules affirmed that the standards of professional
conduct were legal obligations and not merely professional ones." Id.
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Canons and EC's and adopting the Restatement format of black letter
rules and interpretive comments. 0 This format corresponds somewhat to
what has been characterized elsewhere as a "third-level" code, i.e., one
in which "the standards for proper practice are so clearly laid out that
'[w]hat is left is little more than a quasi-criminal code."''3'
Although the Model Rules did not effect the same degree of
structural innovation as did the Model Code, the Model Rules did
incorporate an entirely new format, along with the addition of a number
of entirely new rules addressing subject areas not previously addressed
by the Code.32 Even in Rules covering ground previously trod, there is
no sense that the drafters felt constrained to adhere to either the
substance or even the language of the Code. Indeed, according to one
commentator, the membership of the Kutak Commission was dominated
by "reformist lawyers and legal educators" who "intended a bold
reworking of the Code." 33
Drafting for the Ethics 2000 Commission has been a significantly
different experience than drafting must have been for either the Wright
Committee or the Kutak Commission. One of the first conclusions the
Ethics 2000 Commission drew was that the Model Rules were generally
working quite wellM As a result, the Commission's goal was not to
completely overhaul the Model Rules, but rather to update them in light
of a number of important developments since the Rules were first
adopted, including: (1) the adoption of the Rules by forty-three
jurisdictions, most with significant variations from the Model Rules;
(2) the completion of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, which identified and clarified the legal
30. Cf id. (describing the text of the Rules as "statutory" in format).
31. Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 15 (alteration in original) (internal quotations
omitted). The Model Rules are less "penal" than the Model Code because the Rules contain
constitutive provisions, (e.g., "A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents." MODEL RULES, supra note 15,
R. 1.13(a)), whereas all provisions in the Code are prohibitory (e.g., lawyer may not charge "in
excess of a reasonable fee." MODEL CODE, supra note 14, DR 2-106(b)). See Hazard, supranote 14,
at 90-92. I have elsewhere argued that the Model Rules may constitute a "fourth level" code status,
unattainable by other professional codes, given their unique status as law enacted by the highest
courts of the various jurisdictions. See Moore, Ethical Codes, supra note 6, at 15. I do not believe,
however, that all of the standards either in the current Model Rules or in the Commission's
proposed amendments are so clear that they constitute merely a "quasi-criminal code."
32. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 15, R. 1.13,2.2,2.3, 3.2,5.1-5.3, 8.5.
33. ,VOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 2.6.4, at 61 & n.72. For a more detailed and chronological
account of the movement from the early drafts that prompted much hostility within the bar to
adoption of a revised set of rules by the ABA House of Delegates, see generally Schneyer, supra
note 12.
34. See Veasey, supra note 1, at xi.
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framework in which lawyers work; and (3) the dramatic changes in the
organization and practice of law that have taken place over the last
twenty years, including the growth in the size of law firms, the greater
mobility of lawyers, and sea changes in the technologies available to
both lawyers and clients. 35
What is the significance of the more limited nature of the review
undertaken by the Commission? The guiding motto of the Commission
' Many times the
was one of minimalism: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."36
Reporters would suggest ways in which an existing rule could be
improved, but absent a demonstration that there was some problem that
needed to be solved, we were told simply to forget about it.37 For
example, Rule 1.2(b) states that "A lawyer's representation of a client,
including representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities."3 s The Reporters suggested deleting this statement, or at least
moving it to the Preamble, because although it stated a truism, it did not
appear to be appropriately included either in the black letter rules
themselves or in this rule in particular. 39 The Commission's response,
however, was that lawyers would view removal of the statement as a
symbolic backing away from the sentiments contained in Rule 1.2(b);
therefore, it remained as is.40
Similarly, the Commission spent a great deal of time wrestling with
a statement in the Comment to Rule 3.6-the rule on trial publicitywhich states that publicizing the fact that a defendant has been charged
with a crime will more likely than not have a materially prejudicial
effect on a proceeding unless the prosecutor includes a statement
explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant

35. See id.
36. Cf. id. at xii ("[W]hen a particular provision was found not to be 'broken' we did not try
to 'fix' it."). With a great deal of affection and respect, I attribute the more colloquial quotation to
Commission member Lucian Pera, a commentator for this conference. I believe I am correct that the
expression originated with Lucian, although it was quickly picked up and often recited by virtually
all the members of the Commission.
37. See id.
38. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, R. 1.2(b).
39. See Ethics 2000 Commission, Proposed Rule 1.2-Draft No. 2, Reporter's Observations
(July 29, 1999).
40. The Commission initially agreed that paragraph (b) should be moved to the Preamble. See
Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Aug. 6-8, 1999),
available at http://www.abanetorglcpr/080699mtg.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). Later,
however, the Commission reversed its decision. See Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the
available
at
10-12,
1999),
Professional
Conduct
(Dec.
Rules
of
http:lwww.abanet.org/cpr/121099mtg.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.4" Not only is this
statement inconsistent with the black letter of the Rule,42 but it would
also be absurd to require a prosecutor to repeat the presumption of
innocence in every statement referring to an indicted defendant, even
43
when there are multiple statements issued within a short period of time.
Nevertheless, the Commission agreed to leave the comment alone, once
again because of the "symbolism" of any attempt to delete it.44 The
negative symbolism of removing or changing existing language was a
theme that stymied many of the Reporters' 4 efforts to rid the Rules of
similar anomalies.
In this respect, the process of revising an existing code, rather than
writing on a clean slate, has not been an entirely satisfactory one. In
other respects, however, the opportunity to build on the solid framework
of existing rules enabled the Commission to not only focus on
identifying particular substantive revisions necessary to bring the Rules
into the twenty-first century, but also to reflect more deeply on the
special and evolving nature of lawyer ethics codes.46
41. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 15, R. 3.6 cmts. 5-6 (explaining that there are certain
subjects that are more likely than not to have a materially prejudicial effect on a proceeding
including "the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed
innocent until and unless proven guilty").
42. The text of the Rule provides that a lawyer may state "the offense or claim or defense
involved." Id. R 3.6(b)(1). The Comment however states that it is more likely than not that a
statement will have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding if it includes "the fact that a
defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that
the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless
proven guilty." Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5.
43. Cf Ethics 2000 Commission, Proposed Rule 3.6-Public Discussion Draft, Reporter's
Explanation of Changes (Feb. 21, 2000) ("Although the Commission thinks it is an excellent
practice for prosecutors to remind public audiences that criminal charges are only accusations, the
Commission does not think that the failure to do so each time the prosecutor makes a public
statement is likely to materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding.").
44. The Commission's initial decision was to delete the offending statement in the Comment
because it is inconsistent with the text. See id. After some commentators and members of the
Commission objected to the deletion of subparagraph (6) of Comment 5, however, the Commission
decided to retain it even though it is inconsistent with the text. See Minutes, Commission on
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (May 5-7, 2000), available at
http:/lwww.abanet.orglcpr/050500mtg.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). This issue was discussed at
numerous Commission meetings.
45. The other Reporters for the Ethics 2000 Commission are Professor Carl Pierce of the
University of Tennessee College of Law and Professor Thomas Morgan of The George Washington
University School of Law.
46. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (discussing progression of the ABA legal
ethics code from the 1908 Canons to the 1969 Code and then to the 1983 Model Rules). For a more
general discussion of the typical evolution of professional ethics codes through various stages, see
Moore, EthicalCodes, supranote 6, at 15-16.
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For example, early in its deliberations, the Commission considered
whether it was desirable to make the ethics code more "ethical"-rather
than strictly "legal"-by incorporating some form of "best practices" or
"professionalism" concepts, perhaps in the comments.47 The
Commission quickly concluded that, given the regulatory sophistication
of the Model Rules, it was simply impossible to return to the exhortatory
or aspirational nature of the earlier codes. 8 Indeed, at this point, any
attempt to give such guidance clearly would be misperceived as having a
regulatory dimension. 49
At the same time, however, the Commission refused to view the
Rules as having only a narrow disciplinary function,' i.e., one more akin
to a criminal, or quasi-criminal code. Mindful of the educational role of
the Rules,-" the Commission proposed a number of changes designed
primarily to give greater guidance for lawyers, thus enhancing the
likelihood of compliance with the Rules as professional norms.1 2 For
example, the Commission transformed the Terminology section into an
entirely new black letter rule, Rule 1.0, and then added to it comments
designed to expand upon the black letter definitions. 3 Indeed, the
47. See, e.g., Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Aug.
4, 1997) (discussing "whether it would be possible to add some discussion of 'better practice' back
into the Commentary to the Rules"). Initially, the Reporters were asked to include "Principles of
Better Practice" in their proposed revisions of the various Rules. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Nancy Moore, to Commission on Ethics 2000 (Oct. 3, 1997) (regarding Proposed Rule Revision:
Rule 1.8(f)). This request was made in response to a flurry of activity aimed at implementing the
recommendations of a 1986 ABA report urging lawyers to abide by higher standards of conduct
than the minimum required by disciplinary rules. See generally Moore, EthicalCodes, supranote 6,
at 7 (discussing reactions to report of ABA Commission on Professionalism entitled ".... In the
Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism). Numerous
state and local bar associations had enacted various "'creeds,' 'pledges,' 'statements,' and 'codes'
of professionalism," reflecting not only a desire to enhance the public image of lawyers, but also "a
genuine longing to recapture the pride of 'professionalism,' coupled with an assumption that a lofty
code of ethics is a central component of any true profession." Id. at 8, 11.
48. See Veasey, supranote 1, at xii ("We have also retained the primary disciplinary function
of the Rules, resisting the temptation to preach aspirationally about 'best practices' or
professionalism concepts."); see also Summary of Recommendations, supra note 4 ("[The
Commission] decided early on not to include aspirational 'good practice' notes following each rule,
concerned that these would be out of place in a disciplinary code.").
49. See Veasey, supra note 1, at xii ("Valuable as the profession might find such guidance
[from best practices or professionalism concepts], it would not have-and should not be
misperceived as having-a regulatory dimension.").
50. See id.
51. See id. ("We were however, always conscious of the educational role of the Model
Rules.").
52. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (promoting compliance with professional norms
is a regulatory function of codes).
53. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 8 (R. 1.0); see also Summary of
Recommendations, supra note 4.
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Commission significantly expanded the comments throughout the Rules,
giving more explanations of the rationales for the Rules, adding crossreferences to other Rules, and even providing guidance on other
applicable law 4 Rule 1.7-the basic conflicts of interest rule-was
entirely rewritten and reorganized, primarily to clarify its meaning and
help practitioners understand the application of the Rule in commonly
encountered situations.55
Finally, the Commission constantly struggled with the tension
between specificity and generality in rule drafting.56 In some respects,
the Commission has continued the modem trend toward specificity in
code drafting.57 A good example is the new definition of "writing,"
which is designed to clarify that electronic records are included and is
modeled after the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. 8 In other
respects, however, the Commission opted for a more general regulatory
approach. For example, unlike many state rules, 9 the Commission's ban
on sexual relationships between lawyers and clients does not contain a
definition of what constitutes a "sexual relationship." 6 Nor does the new
definition of "screening" specify the institutional mechanisms that must
be adopted to protect the confidentiality of client information.6 ' In these
instances, the Commission was less concerned with clarity and notice to
lawyers and more concerned with flexibility, recognizing that the terms
of disciplinary rules are (and should be) increasingly subject to case-by54. See generally REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1.
55. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 54, 65 (R. 1.7 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes). The only substantive change in the text of the rule is the new requirement
that the informed consent of the client be "confirmed in writing." Id.at 54 (R. 1.7(b)(4)). For a
detailed explanation of the changes made to this Rule, see id. at 65-74 (Reporter's Explanation of
Changes).
56. For discussions of specificity and generality in ethics code drafting, see generally
McDonough & Epstein, supranote 14; Fred C. Zacharias, Foreword:The Questfor a PerfectCode,
I1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility
Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223
(1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Theory, Practice,and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics].
57. See McDonough & Epstein, supranote 14, at 609.
58. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 9, 13 (R. 1.0(n) & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes); see also Summary of Recommendations,supra note 4.
59. See, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(k)(1) (2001) ("'Sexual relations'
means sexual intercourse or any other intentional touching of the intimate parts of a person or
causing the person to touch the intimate parts of the lawyer."); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-111(A) (2001) ("'Sexual relations' means sexual intercourse or the touching
of an intimate part of another person for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or
sexual abuse.").
60. See REPoRT WTH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 75 (R. 1.8(j)).
61.

See REPORTWITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 9, 11 (R. 1.0(k) & cmts. 8-10); see

also Summary of Recommendations,supranote 4.
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case interpretation by ethics committees or courts,6 2 both in disciplinary
and in other types of cases. 63 Thus, once again, the Commission insisted
that ethics codes are not merely criminal codes for lawyers, but rather
serve a far broader function in the regulation of the legal profession.6
III. BRINGING THE RULES INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Limited to "fixing" what was "broke," 65 the sorts of changes we
recommended can be categorized along the lines of the three important
developments previously mentioned-(1) the adoption of significant
variations of the Rules by the states; (2) the completion of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers; and
(3) recent and dramatic
66
law.
of
practice
and
organization
the
in
changes
A.

State Variations

The fact that forty-three jurisdictions have adopted the Model
Rules, but with significant variation in a number of Rules,67 is both bad
news and good news. The bad news is that state variation is a serious
problem in a world increasingly dominated by the multijurisdictional (or
cross-border) practice of law.6
In addition to addressing
62. Professor Zacharias believes that ethics codes differ from other legislation because
professional code provisions are rarely fleshed out in ethics or judicial opinions. See Zacharias,
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of ProsecutorialEthics, supra note 56, at 237-38. This may
once have been true, but as Professor Bruce Green concludes in his paper for this Symposium,
clarifying ethics opinions have become both more prevalent and more accessible. See Bruce A.
Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 732
(2002); see also Nancy J.Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
541, 542 (1996) [hereinafter Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts] (noting "the everburgeoning number of ethics opinions and court decisions that interpret and apply the code
provisions (or their common law equivalents) in a wide variety of contexts").
63. See, e.g., Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, supra note 62, at 542-44
(discussing various contexts in which conflicts of interest rules are enforceable, including fee
forfeiture, disqualification, lawsuits seeking damages for breach of fiduciary duties, recission of
gifts to lawyers and business deals between lawyers and clients, and even the imposition of criminal
sanctions).
64. See Veasey, supra note 1, at xii.
65. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
66. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
67. At the time the Commission was appointed, thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had adopted some version of the Rules, with significant variations in particular rules from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Summary of Recommendations, supra note 4. Since that time an
additional four states have adopted a version of the Model Rules. See State Ethics Rules, Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 01:03-4 (2001) (indicating four state adoptions between
1998 and 2001).
68. The primary problem posed by multijurisdictional practice concerns the scope and
application of unauthorized practice of law restrictions on lawyers traveling on behalf of their
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multijurisdictional practice directly in Rules 5.569 and 8.5,70 the
Commission wanted to see which of the Model Rules were most subject
to variation, with a view toward offering a version of these 7Rules that
might persuade the states to move towards greater uniformity. 1
The good news is that the states have been experimenting with a
variety of approaches to both age-old and new regulatory dilemmas, and
the Commission was fortunate to be able to draw upon their experience
in formulating its own recommendations. 7' For example, although the
ABA had refused to endorse written fee agreements in 1983, 73 seven
states have done so in the interim.74 Talking with the lawyers in those
clients to jurisdictions in which they are not licensed to practice. See generally BRUCE A. GREEN,
CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, ASSISTING CLIENTS WITH MULTI-STATE AND INTERSTATE
LEGAL PROBLEMS: THE NEED TO BRING THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF LAvYERS INTO THE
21ST CENTURY, (2000), available at http://vww.abaneLorglcprlmjp-bruce-green-report.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002). An additional problem, however, is the choice of law question that arises
when a lawyer's services affect more than one jurisdiction and the jurisdictions' rules would
produce different results in determining whether the lawyer has committed misconduct. For a
general discussion of the conflict of laws issues arising in multijurisdictional practice, including
choice of law, see William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Multi-JurisdictionPracticeand
the Conflict of Lavs, (2000), Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, ABA, at http:lwww.abanet.orglcpr/mjpwreynolds.html (last visited Feb. 4,2002).
69. In its proposed amendments to Rule 5.5, the Commission did not purport to address all
aspects of multijurisdictional practice, but rather created four "safe harbors" affording out-of-state
lawyers some latitude in interstate and international travel, for purposes of disciplinary action. See
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supranote 1, at 214, 217-19 (R. 5.5 & Reporter's Explanation of
Changes). This Rule, along with Rule 8.5, see infra note 70, was not considered by the ABA House
of Delegates in February 2002, but will be considered along with the forthcoming report of the ABA
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, which is scheduled to be considered in August 2002.
See supra note 5.
70. In its proposed amendments to Rule 8.5, the Commission recommends: (1) broadening a
jurisdiction's authority to discipline lawyers not licensed in the jurisdiction who nevertheless render
or offer to render legal services in this jurisdiction, and (2) revising the choice of law provisions to
permit application of the rules of the jurisdiction where the misconduct occurs or where the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 1, at 274, 277-78 (R. 8.5 & Reporter's Explanation of Changes). This Rule, along with Rule
5.5, see supra note 69, was not considered by the ABA House of Delegates in February 2002, but
will be considered along with the forthcoming report of the ABA Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice, which is scheduled to be considered in August 2002. See supra note 5.
71. Cf. Veasey, supra note 1, at xiii (discussing the Commission's review of Rules with
significant state variation). This was a particular concern of the Commission's Chair, Chief Justice
E. Norman Veasey of the Supreme Court of Delaware, who was also Chair of the Conference of
Chief Justices during much of the tenure of the Commission.
72. See id. at xii-xiii (pointing out the disparity in the states' ethics codes).
73. See WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 9.2 at 502.
74. All but one of the states provide that the writing requirement applies only when the lawyer
has not regularly represented the client. See CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1998);
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1998); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b)
(1999); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1998); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.5(b) (1997); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2001). But see CAL. BUS. & PROF.
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states, the Commission learned that the requirement has proved to be
workable, even for small firms and solo practitioners. 7 Thus, the
Commission was comfortable in proposing that lawyers be required to
communicate their fees in writing, although the Commission was also
persuaded to fashion a de minimis fee exception,76 as several of the states
have done."
Similarly, the Commission drew upon the experience of three
states-California, 7s Washington, 79 and Wisconsin °-in proposing that
conflicts waivers be confirmed in writing. 8' The proposed writings
CODE § 6148(a) (West Supp. 2002). This was also the approach taken by the Commission. See
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 34 (R. 1.5(b)).
75. See, e.g., Written Testimony of Richard A. Zitrin (May 29, 1998) [hereinafter Zitrin
Testimony], available at http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/zitrin.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2002) (noting
that requiring written fee agreements in all but de minimis matters has worked well in California).
Two members of the Commission-Lawrence J. Fox of Pennsylvania and Laurie D. Zelon of
California-were practicing lawyers in states requiring written fee agreements.
76. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 34 (R. 1.5(b)) ("This paragraph
does not apply in any matter in which it is reasonably foreseeable that total cost to a client,
including attorney fees, will be [$500] or less.").
In August 2001, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the Commission's proposal to
require that lawyers communicate fees and expenses in writing. See August 2001 Summary, supra
note 5. Nevertheless, the Commission's proposal is important because it may influence some states
to make the recommended change, just as the Kutak Commission's defeated proposal to require
written fee agreements prompted a few states to require them when initially adopting the Model
Rules. See e.g., CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 6148(a) (West Supp. 2002). This is also true of other
proposals that have been rejected by the House of Delegates, such as the screening proposal in Rule
1.10. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
77. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6148(a) (West Supp. 2002) (writing requirement applies
when "it is reasonably foreseeable that total expense to a client, including attorney fees, will exceed
one thousand dollars ($1,000)"); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2001) (writing
requirement applies only when "it is reasonably foreseeable that total attorneys fees to the client will
exceed $750.00").
78. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C) (1996) (requiring the "informed
written consent of each client").
79. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002) (requiring that "[e]ach client
consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts"); see also id.
Terminology ("'Consents in writing' or 'written consent' means either (a) a written consent
executed by a client, or (b) oral consent given by a client which the lawyer confirms in writing in a
manner which can be easily understood by the client and which is promptly transmitted to
the client").
80. See WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002) (requiring that "each client
consents in writing after consultation").
81. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 54 (R. 1.7(b)). The Commission
had initially proposed that the client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client, but
subsequently adopted the Washington approach of requiring only that an oral consent be confirmed
in writing, after hearing from numerous commentators that the signed writing requirement might be
too onerous a burden to impose on lawyers. See Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Feb. 11-13, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/021100mtg.htmi
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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requirements are among a number of changes designed to respond to the
number one complaint about lawyers-that they do not adequately
communicate with their clients. 2
B. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
In 2000, the American Law Institute published an entirely new
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement")-a project
that was more than ten years in the making. 3 The Restatement has
identified and clarified the legal framework within which lawyers work,
forcing the Commission to confront the increasingly complex
relationship between disciplinary law and "other law." ' This "other law"
includes not only sanctions for disciplinary violations in the form of fee
forfeituren but also legal sources as wide ranging as criminal law and
procedure, civil procedure, evidence law, agency law, tort law, contract
law, securities law and corporation law.86
First and foremost, the Model Rules serve as a basis for lawyer
discipline" and self-regulation.u Nevertheless, members of the
Commission were cognizant, as are most lawyers, that the rules are often
used in other contexts; for example, as a basis for disqualification or as

82. See Nancy J. Moore, Written Communications, A.B.A. J., May 2001, at 62, 62. Other
changes designed to clarify and strengthen a lawyer's duty to communicate with the client include:
(1) replacing "consents after consultation" with "informed consent" through the Rules;
(2) clarifying the allocation of authority between client and lawyer, (3) combining allaspects of a
lawyer's duty to communicate with a client into a single rule; and (4) adding a requirement that a
lawyer communicate the scope of the representation and the basis for charging expenses, along with
the basis for the lawyer's fee. See Veasey, supranote 1, at xiii-xiv.
83. See Charles W. Wolfram, Reporter's Preface to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS xxiii (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
84. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and FederalProsecutors:The
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 311-15 (1992)
(discussing tension between "bar's law" and states' "other law"); cf. Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Barand the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (1992) ("The state and the profession
have different understandings of the law governing lawyers-they have in effect different 'law."').
The Restatement has brought together various sources of law, including both "ethics law" and
"other law," in a single document. See Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between
Prosecutorsand Defense Attorneys: A Pleafor an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 515, 516 n.8 (1992) [hereinafter Moore, A Pleafor an End to the CurrentHostilities].
85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 37 ("A lawyer engaging in clear and serious
violation of duty to a client may be required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for
the matter.").
86. See Moore, A Pleafor an End to the CurrentHostilities,supranote 84, at 516.
87. See WOLFRAM, supranote 26, § 2.6, at 51 ("Modem lawyer codes plainly are adopted by
courts and legislatures for the purpose of authoritatively measuring a lawyer's liability to
professional discipline.").
88. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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evidence of the applicable standard of conduct in civil liability
lawsuits.8 9 Indeed, one change proposed by the Commission was to
clearly acknowledge, as the current Model Rules do not, that while
violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against
a lawyer, the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers;
therefore, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of
the applicable standard of conduct in civil liability cases and other
nondisciplinary proceedings involving a lawyer. 9°
Given what we now know about the law governing lawyers, the
Commission found it useful to make greater use of the comments 9' to
alert lawyers to their obligations under other law, particularly when such
obligations are more extensive than is reflected in the disciplinary rules.
For example, as amended, the text of Rule 1.8(c) provides:
A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving
the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift
unless
9
the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. 2
The Comment, however, goes on to note that although lawyers will not
be disciplined for accepting unsolicited gifts, such a gift "may be
voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats
client gifts as presumptively fraudulent." 93 Similarly, a new Comment to
Rule 1.5 on legal fees alerts lawyers to the possibility that applicable law
may impose additional limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling
on the percentage allowed, or on other fees, such as government
regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters. 94 Here the goal is not to
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 52(2) & cmt. f.
90. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 4, 7 (Scope 120 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes).
91. In its Final Report, the Commission substituted the term "commentary" for "comment."
See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1. That change was widely criticized, and the
term has been changed back to "comment" throughout the Rules. See generally ETHICS 2000
COMM'N, ABA, REPORT 401 (As PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES) (2002), available at
http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-202reportsumm.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
92. REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note I, at 74 (R. 1.8(c)). The current rule
prohibits only "prepar[ing] an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as
parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift."
MODEL RULES, supranote 15, R. 1.8(c).
93. REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 77, 84 (R. 1.8 cmt. 6 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes). For a discussion of the law of undue influence, see RESTATEMENT, supra
note 83, § 127 & cmt. a (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 343 cmts. 1& m (1959) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981)).
94. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supranote 1, at 36,40 (R. 1.5 cmt. 3 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes). For a discussion of some types of statutes and rules that regulate the size
of lawyer fees, see RESTATEMENT, supranote 83, § 34 & cmt. g.
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serve the disciplinary process, but rather to help practicing lawyers who
may not be familiar with the wide scope of statutory and common law
that, along with disciplinary rules, constitutes the law governing

lawyers.9";
In these instances, the relationship between disciplinary law and
other law is straightforward and complementary. In other situations,
however, there: may be tension between the two. For example, in crafting
its proposed rule on the screening of lateral lawyers, the Commission

understood that in a disqualification context, many courts would
consider the extent to which the personally disqualified lawyer had been
substantially involved in the matter before permitting that lawyer to be
screened.' The Commission believed, however, that such an exception
95. The Scope section of the Commission Report concisely explains the purpose of the
Comments:
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific
obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are
sometimes used to alertlawyers to their responsibilitiesundersuch other law.
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 3 (Scope 15) (italicized material added by
Commission).
96. Current Model Rule 1.10 does not provide for screening to avoid imputation of a former
client conflict of a lawyer who has moved laterally from one private firm to another. See MODEL
RuLES, supra note 15, R. 1.10. Over the last decade, however, a number of states have amended
their codes to permit the use of screening in former private client representation. See, e.g., Clinard v.
Blackwood, No. 01A01-9801-CV-00029, 1999 WL 976582, at *12 (Tenn. CL App. Oct. 28, 1999)
(citing amended rules in six jurisdictions: Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania
and Washington), aft'd, 46 S.W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001); see also KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
R. 1.10(d)(1) (2001); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.10(b) (2000); MINN. RuLES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, R. 1.10(b) (2001); Proposed Rule 1.10(B), Tennessee Bar Ass'n Comm. for the Study of
Standards of Professional Conduct (Nov. 1, 1997); Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688
N.E.2d 258, 264-65 (Ohio 1998) (adopting screening by court decision). Regardless of whether a
jurisdiction's disciplinary rules permit such screening, however, when the issue arises under a
motion to disqualify, courts have discretion whether or not to require disqualification. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 124 cmt. d(i); see also Petrovich v. Petrovich, 556 So.2d 281, 282
(La. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding screening measures without reference to state's disciplinary code);
Kassis v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 717 N.E.2d 674, 677 (N.Y. 1999) (approving use of
screening to avoid disqualification, stating that disciplinary rules do not establish a mandatory
disqualification rule because "'it is particularly important that the Code of Professional
Responsibility not be mechanically applied when disqualification is raised in litigation.' (quoting
S&S Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. 777 S.HL Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 651 (N.Y. 1987))). Of the
jurisdictions that provide screening to avoid imputed conflicts in the private practice setting, some
permit screening irrespective of the amount of confidential information possessed by the personally
disqualified lawyer, whereas other follow the Restatement approach of permitting screening only
when any such information is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 124. Compare Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen,
849 F.2d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that a firm should be permitted to show that its screening
had prevented disclosure of confidential information by newly hired lawyer with extensive exposure
to confidential information), with Clinard,46 S.W.3d at 184 (stating that a substantial relationship
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to the screening rule could not realistically be enforced in a disciplinary
proceeding.97 As a result, the compromise proposed by the Commission
was to reject a proposed "side-switching lawyer" exception to the black
letter rule,98 but to note in the Comment that "[l]awyers should be
aware... that courts may impose more stringent obligations in ruling
upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation. ' 99
However, some Commission members believed that such an exception
should have been included in the disciplinary rule. These members
argued that the rule was not likely to be enforced in a disciplinary
context, and so it was better to take a position that would then influence
courts to create such an exception in the disqualification context.I°°
Under either view, it is clear that the proposed rules were being used not
merely to reflect other law but rather to shape it.
The screening example is one where the tension exists between
clarity and notice to the lawyer on the one hand and nuance and
complexity on the other. A different sort of tension occurs in other
contexts. For example, Rule 1.6, as amended, now provides that a lawyer
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client when

exists when "'the subsequent representation is adverse to the matters at issue in the previous
relationship' or when 'the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subject representation can
be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question."' (quoting Tenn. Bd. of Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 89-F-1 18, 1989 WL 544365, at *3 (1989))).
97. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 96, 100-01 (R. 1.10 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes).
98. The November 2000 Report of the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 1.10 would
have permitted screening to avoid imputation of a former client conflict of a lateral lawyer only
when "the matter does not involve a proceeding before a tribunal in which the personally
disqualified lawyer had a substantial role." CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 220 (2000)
(R. 1.10(c)(1)), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
The Commission indicated that it believed the exception was necessary to protect the interests of
tribunals in the integrity of the proceedings before them. See id. at 225 (Reporter's Explanation of
Changes). Subsequently, however, the Commission heard testimony in opposition to the exception
on the ground that it would require extensive litigation on the question of whether a lawyer's
involvement constituted a substantial relationship. The Reporter was persuaded that this was an
exception that could be imposed by courts but that it was inappropriate for inclusion into a
disciplinary rule and recommended deleting the exception. See Ethics 2000 Commission, Proposed
Rule 1.10-Revised Final Draft, Reporter's Observations (Mar. 2001). Thus, the exception did not
appear in the Rule approved by the Commission for inclusion in the Final Report. See REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 96 (R. 1.10(c)). The ABA House of Delegates voted to delete
the screening exception in paragraph (c). See August 2001 Summary, supranote 5.
99. REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 98, 102 (R. 1.10 cmt. 6 & Reporter's
Explanation of Changes).
100. The Commission voted by a vote of 6 to 4 to delete paragraph (c)(1) from Rule 1.10. See
Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Mar. 16-17, 2001),
availableat http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-03-16mtg.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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necessary "to comply with other law or a court order."'0 ' In what respect
is it proper to say that disclosure "to comply with other law or a court
order" is merely permissive, as opposed to mandatory? As the Comment
suggests, it is not always clear whether and when "other law" does in
fact require a lawyer to disclose confidential information about a
client."'O For example, in the famous "buried bodies" case, a public
health law on its face required anyone knowing of the death of a person
without medical attendance to report that death to the proper
authorities.' 3 Nevertheless, a New York court held that the statute did
not apply to a criminal defense lawyer having information protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 4 Even when the purported reach of a
statute is clear, it may constitute an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers doctrine, at least in jurisdictions that have adopted
the more extreme version of the inherent power of courts to regulate the
power of attorney.'05 Thus, the use of permissive disclosure here is not
intended to reflect what Susan Koniak describes as the competition
between the bar's normative vision and that of the state's,116 but rather to
give lawyers some leeway in determining precisely when the state's law
requires the disclosure of otherwise confidential information.
Before leaving the subject of the relationship between disciplinary
law and other law, there is another aspect of the problem that should be
mentioned-determining which issues are appropriate for treatment in
disciplinary rules and which issues are best left to other law. Richard
Zitrin proposed that the Commission adopt a rule prohibiting lawyers
from participating in confidential settlements when the public safety is
involved.'0 7 The Commission declined to do so, believing that the
101. REPORTWITHRECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 42 (R. 1.6(b)(6)).
102. See id. at 46 (R. 1.6 cmt. 12) ("Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information
about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of
these Rules.").
103. See People v. BeIge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798,799 (County Ct.) (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§§ 4200(1), 4143 (n.d.)), aff'd, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 771,771 (App. Div. 1975).
104. See id. at 803 (granting defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege excused the attorney from making full disclosure to the
authorities).
105. For a discussion of the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine, see WoLFRAM,
supra note 26, § 2.2.3, at 27-28.
106. See Koniak, supra note 84, at 1391.
107. See Zitrin Testimony, supra note 75. His proposal was to amend Rule 3.2 to add a new
provision (labeled 'B"), which was modeled on current Rule 5.6(b):
(B) A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement, whether in
connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, to prevent or restrict the availability to the public
of information that the lawyer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger
to the public health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particular individual(s).
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problem was one that was best left to courts or legislatures. ta Zitrin, and
other proponents of this rule, have been disappointed with the
Commission's decision, pointing to other rules that impose obligations
on lawyers beyond those required by other law.' For the Commission,
however, the issue was not whether disciplinary rules can go beyond
other law-surely they can and indeed they do in many instances;110
rather, the question is whether the disciplinary rules should impose
prohibitions on lawyers that unfairly impinge on a client's ability to
obtain the lawyer's advice on conduct that is perfectly lawful on the part
of the client. The difference then between Rule 5.6(b) and the Zitrin
proposal is this: Rule 5.6(b) prohibits lawyers from participating in
settlement agreements that restrict the lawyer's right to represent other
clients in similar matters."' Clients have no independent legal right to
require the lawyer to make such agreements in order to facilitate
settlements that are favorable for the client.' 2 But as long as clients have
the legal right to enter into settlements that require the client to keep
information confidential," 3 then clients ought to be able to have their

Id.; see also Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know
Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 116 (1999) (making the same proposal).
108. See Minutes, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(Feb. 16-17, 2001), available at http:llwww.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-02-16mtg.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2002):
The Commission next considered Richard Zitrin's proposal to add a new Rule
3.2(b). The Reporter noted that when the Commission previously discussed this matter it
felt that it was better to have a court rule regulating the parties.
After discussion the Commission unanimously agreed that the ethics rules were not
the vehicle for solving this problem.
Id.
109. For example, Richard Zitrin notes that:
Rule 5.6(B) [sic] currently prevents a lawyer from participating in offering or assisting in
an agreement to restrict the lawyer's right to practice, such as agreeing not to take any
more cases against X Co. The language of proposed rule 3.2(B) parallels Rule 5.6's
language ("shall not participate in offering or making an agreement ... ").
E-mail from Richard Zitrin, to Various Recipients (Feb. 6,2001) (on file with Author).
110. Cf. Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 247 (1985) (criticizing the Model Rules for merely
restating, in many instances, what other law already requires and not placing additional, purely
"ethical" obligations on lawyers in these situations).
111. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 15, R. 5.6 ("A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making ... an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the
settlement of a controversy between private parties.").
112. Absent Rule 5.6(b), a lawyer could lawfully agree not to represent future claimants in
return for a more favorable settlement for an existing client, but the lawyer would not be required to
do so simply because such an agreement would benefit that client. See id.
113. But see generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned
in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HoFSTRA L. REv. 783 (2002).
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lawyers advise them and even participate in making such settlements."'
If these agreements are bad for society-and I agree that they are-then
no one should be entitled to make them."5 And if the clients themselves
are banned from making them, then the prohibition on lawyer assistance
necessarily follows." 6 It is regrettable that most courts and legislatures
do not have the political will to enact such legal restrictions, but that
lack of political will should not put pressure on the disciplinary system
to accomplish indirectly what cannot be accomplished directly in the
political arena.
C. Changes in the Organizationand Practiceof Law
Let me turn now to the third and final category of changes proposed
by the Commission, i.e., those that respond to dramatic changes in the
practice of law over the last twenty years. Among other changes, the
Commission proposed greater use of screening in recognition of the

114. The same point is made in an addition to the Comment to Rule 8A(a), which forbids
lawyers from violating the Rules "through the acts of another." REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION,
supra note 1, at 271 (R. 8.4 cmt. 1). The Commission proposed to amend the Comment to add the
following paragraph:
Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the
acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf.
Paragraph(a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning
action the client is lawfully entitled to take.
Id. (emphasis added). A related proposed amendment to the Comments following Rule 4.2 is:
Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking
advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer
may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another. See
Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer
is not prohibitedfrom advising a client concerning a communication that the client is
legally entitled to make.
Id. at 195 (R. 4.2 cmt. 2) (emphasis added).
115. See Koniak, supranote 113, at 787-88. Susan Koniak wants to outlaw secret settlements,
and says she is indifferent to whether the prohibition is contained in an ethics rule or in a court rule
or statute directed to both the parties and their attorneys. See Susan P. Koniak, Remarks at Legal
Ethics: What Needs Fixing? (Sept. 9, 2001). According to her, such settlements are not effective
unless the lawyer agrees to be personally bound. See id. If Zitrin's rule had been directed solely to
prohibiting lawyers from making themselves bound by such agreements (thus permitting them to
advise their clients regarding settlements in which the client alone is bound), the analogy to Rule 5.6
would have been more apt. Of course, lawyers would still be bound to keep the information
confidential under Rule 1.9(c), but at least they would be permitted to reveal information when
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily injury. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 15, R. 1.9(c); REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supranote 1, at42 (R. 1.6(a)).
116. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ....
).
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7
increased mobility of lawyers and the growth in the size of law firms."
In addition, the Commission responded to changing technology by
clarifying the application of the advertising and solicitation rules to
lawyers' extensive use of the Internet, including lawyer web pages,
participation in live chat rooms and use of e-mail." s Also, in Rule 4.4(b),
the Commission proposed a rule that would address the now ubiquitous
problem of the inadvertent fax." 9 As for other important changes in law
practice, the Commission did not play an active role in the ABA debate
on multidisciplinary practice. 2 0 It did participate, however, in the debate

117. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, the ABA House of
Delegates did not approve the Commission's recommendation to permit screening to avoid
imputation of the former client conflicts of laterally hired lawyers. See supra note 98. Nevertheless,
it is my belief that the Commission's recommendation is important because it may influence some
states to make the recommended change. See supra note 98.
118. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 243 (R. 7.2) (amending text of
advertising rule to reference permissive advertising through electronic communication and revising
Comment to include references to electronic media, such as the Internet); id. at 249 (R. 7.3)
(amending text of solicitation rule to generally prohibit real-time electronic contact, but to permit
other electronic communication to the same extent as other written or recorded communications and
revising the Comment to include references to electronic communication); id at 259 (R. 7.5)
(amending text of rule regulating firm names and letterheads to include regulation of professional
designation such as distinctive website addresses).
119. Under the Commission's proposed rule, a lawyer who receives a document, including email or other electronic modes of transmission, and "knows or reasonably should know that the
document was inadvertently sent" need only "promptly notify the sender." REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 202 (R. 4.4(b)); see also id. at 195 (R. 4.2 cmt. 2). Whether
more is required, such as returning the original document, is considered to be a matter of law
beyond the scope of the Rules. See id. at 202 (R. 4.4 cmt. 2). This is an issue that has been resolved
differently by the various ethics committees that have addressed the question. See, e.g., Kondakjian
v. Port Auth., No. 94 Civ. 8013, 1996 WL 139782, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1996) (including full
text of report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York which discusses differing
approaches taken by various bar associations). I personally would have preferred an earlier
proposed version of Rule 4.4(b), which would have provided as follows:
(b) A lawyer who receives a document and knows, before reading the document, that it
has been inadvertently sent, shall not examine the document, but shall notify the sending
person and abide by the instructions of the sending person regarding the return or
destruction of the document. A lawyer who receives a document and does not know,
before reading the document, that it has been inadvertently sent, but later has reason to
believe the document was inadvertently sent, shall notify the sending person and, if
requested to do so, shall return the original document.
Ethics 2000 Commission, Proposed Revised Rule 4.4-Draft No. 2 (July 15, 1999). This proposal
was based on the rule proposed by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See
Kondakjian, 1996 WL 139782, at *7-8.
120. For a discussion of the work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, see
ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Report to the House of
Delegates (May 11, 2000), available at http:llwww.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002). For the reaction of the ABA House of Delegates, see Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility,
ABA,
Recommendation
(July
2000),
available
at
http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/mdprecomlOF.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (rejecting the
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on multijurisdictional practice' by proposing in Rule 5.5 the creation of
four safe harbors for lawyers engaged in certain forms of cross-border
practice.'22 Also, in Rule 8.5, the Commission proposed that disciplinary
authorities assert their authority to discipline any lawyer who commits
misconduct in the jurisdiction-not just lawyers admitted to practice
there-and also proposed a more appropriate choice of law rule,
including a safe harbor for lawyers who attempt in good faith to conform
their conduct to what they believe is the applicable rule.'"
Even in this last category-response to changes in law practicethe Commission not only has been guided by the wisdom of the states,
but also was forced yet again to confront the increasingly complex
process of integrating disciplinary law and other law.' 24 Thus, the
Commission drew largely upon the states' experiences with screening
rules' s-including specification of the institutional mechanisms that are
necessary to implement a proper screen 2--as well as individual state
Commission's proposal and disbanding the Commission). For the adoption of resolution 10F, see
ABA House of Delegates Report 10F (June 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreportl0f.html (last visited May 15, 2002).
121. For a discussion of the work of the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, see
generally COMM'N ON MULTJURISDICriONAL PRACICE, ABA, INTERIM REPORT (2001), available
at http://www.abaneLorgtcpr/mjp-final-interirn.report.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,2002).
122. See REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 214 (R.5.5). This proposal states
that a lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction but not in the adopting jurisdiction does not
engage in the unauthorized practice of law when: (1) the lawyer has been authorized or expects to
be authorized by a tribunal or other agency for purposes of a particular proceeding; (2) the lawyer is
in-house counsel and is acting on the client's behalf; (3) the lawyers is acting with respect to a
matter arising out of or reasonably related to the lawyer's otherwise proper representation of a
client; or (4) the lawyer associates in the matter with local counsel. See also supra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text.
123. See REPORT wiTH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 274 (R. 8.5). The Commission
proposes adding to paragraph (a) that "A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to
the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer renders or offers to render any legal
services in this jurisdiction[,]" and further proposes to amend paragraph (b), inter alia, to include the
following safe harbor provision: "A lawyer is not subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct
conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant
effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur." lId; see also supranote 70 and accompanying text.
124. See discussion supra Part I1I.B (discussing complex relationship between disciplinary
rules and the "other law").
125. See supra note 96 (noting states that have recently amended their codes to permit the use
of screening in former private client representation).
126. See OR. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(W) (2001) (providing for service of
affidavit by personally disqualified lawyer and firm attesting to personally disqualified lawyer's
lack of participation and, at request of former client, attesting to actual compliance with screening
procedures); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.10(b) (2001) (providing for execution of
affidavit, including notice of specific screening measures being employed). Compare, e.g., PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2001) (falling to provide any specification of effective
screening measures required under the Rule), with, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
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rules 7 and ethics committee opinions ' 2 on marketing lawyers services
on the Internet. At the same time, the Commission was challenged to
justify its use of Rule 5.5 to create safe harbors from the application of
unauthorized practice of law statutes, given that the disciplinary rules
have not previously been used to define what does and does not
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.'29
IV. CONCLUSION
Serving as Chief Reporter to the Commission on the Evaluation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct has been both an honor and a
pleasure. I even had my fifteen minutes of fame in the short-lived media
blitz that surrounded the ABA Annual Meeting in Chicago.' But I am
an academic at heart, and I am delighted to leave the real world of ABA
politics and return to my ivory tower in Boston. I am grateful to Hofstra
Law School for sponsoring this Symposium and for giving me the
opportunity to reflect on the significance of my real world experience in
R. 1.10(e) (2001) (detailing elaborate screening measures including isolation of personally
disqualified lawyer, notice to former client of screening procedures, and affidavit executed by
personally disqualified firm). The Commission chose to provide some additional guidance to the
practicing lawyer but without an elaborate specification of required procedures or any required
affidavits from either the personally disqualified lawyer or the firm. See REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 9 (R. 1.0(k)) (including in the new terminology Rule the
definition of the term "screened" to denote "the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a
matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under
the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these
Rules or other law"); idL at 11 (R. 1.0 cmts. 8-10) (suggesting various measures that might be used
to create reasonably adequate screening measures).
127. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.1(a) (2001) (permitting lawyers to
advertise through "computer-accessed communications"); TENN. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-104 (2001) (providing that solicitation rules apply to direct contact with prospective clients
through the internet).
128. See, e.g., Iowa Ethics Op. 95-21 (1996) (providing that lawyers with websites must
comply with the state's ethics rules on advertising, including publication of mandatory disclosures);
Pa. Ethics Op. 96-17 (1996) (advising that website communications are subject to state's ethics
rules on advertising, including disclosure and record-keeping requirements; further advising that a
website does not constitute prohibited in-person solicitation).
129. See, e.g., E-mail from George A. Riemer to Sue Campbell (June 15, 2000) (on file with
Author) (expressing concern that a lawyer not subject to discipline under the proposed Rule 5.5
might still be subject to sanction under express rules or statutes prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law).
130. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Lawyers Consider Easing Restriction on Client Secrecy,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at Al. As a result of the New York Times article, I received a number of
calls from reporters and was invited to appear on several radio and television programs. I quickly
learned, however, about the fleeting nature of fame, when several scheduled appearances on various
television interview programs were cancelled because of developments in the Gary Condit-Chandra
Levy story, then prominent in the news.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss3/13

22

Moore: Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century
2002]

LAWYER ETHICS CODE DRAFTING

945

drafting a lawyers' ethics code at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
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